



- Online Anonymity
 - Open Source
 - Open Network
 - Community of researchers, developers, users and relay operators.
- U.S. 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization





Threat model: what can the attacker do?




Anonymity isn't encryption: Encryption just protects contents.








"It's traffic-analysis resistance!" **Businesses Anonymity** Governments "It's network security!" **Private citizens** "It's privacy!"




The simplest designs use a single relay to hide connections.




(example: some commercial proxy providers)

But a central relay is a single point of failure.




... or a single point of bypass.





Timing analysis bridges all connections through relay ⇒ An attractive fat target

So, add multiple relays so that no single one can betray Alice.





Alice makes a session key with R1 ...And then tunnels to R2...and to R3





Total relay bandwidth





The Tor Project - https://metrics.torproject.org/


Tor's safety comes from diversity

- #1: Diversity of relays. The more relays we have and the more diverse they are, the fewer attackers are in a position to do traffic confirmation. (Research problem: measuring diversity over time)
- #2: Diversity of users and reasons to use it. 50000 users in Iran means almost all of them are normal citizens.

Transparency for Tor is key


- Open source / free software
- Public design documents and specifications
- Publicly identified developers
- Not a contradiction: privacy is about choice!

Directly connecting users from Russia




The Tor Project - https://metrics.torproject.org/

Directly connecting users from the United Arab Emirates




The Tor Project - https://metrics.torproject.org/


Pluggable transports



Pluggable transports

- Flashproxy (Stanford), websocket
- FTEProxy (Portland St), http via regex
- Stegotorus (SRI/CMU), http
- Skypemorph (Waterloo), Skype video
- uProxy (Google), webrtc
- ScrambleSuit (Karlstad), obfs-based
- Telex (Michigan/Waterloo), traffic divert






1 Million People use Facebook over Tor



People who choose to communicate over Tor do so for a variety of reasons related to privacy, security and safety. As we've written previously it's important to us to provide methods for people to use our services securely – particularly if they lack reliable methods to do so.

This is why in the last two years we built the Facebook onion site and onionmobile site, helped standardise the ".onion" domain name, and implemented Tor connectivity for our Android mobile app by enabling connections through Orbot.

ooni.torproject.org



explorer.ooni.torproject.org




OONI Explorer



Explorer

Highlights

About





"Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity"

Contenders for the throne:

None